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INTRODUCTION 
The fruits of the biotechnology revolution are beginning to be harvested. Recent regulatory 
approvals of a variety of advanced therapies—Keytruda (pembrolizumab), 1  Kymriah 
(tisagenlecleucel),2 and patisiran3—have ushered in an age of “precision medicine” treatments that 
target patients’ specific genetic, physiological, and environmental profiles rather than generalized 
diagnoses of disease. 4  Therapies like these may soon be supplemented by gene editing 
technologies such as CRISPR, which could enable the targeted eradication of deleterious genetic 
variants to improve human health. But the intellectual property (IP) surrounding precision 
therapies and their foundational technology remain controversial.5 Precision therapies ultimately 
rely—and are roughly congruent with—basic scientific information developed in the service of 
academic research.6 Much of precision medicine’s IP, however, is held by academic research 
institutions that employ for-profit surrogate companies, companies responsible both for 
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2014Sept. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Keytruda Approval Letter], 
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2 Letter from Wilson W. Bryan, Director, Office of Tissues and Advanced Therapies, Center for Biologics 




3 Patisiran has, in fact, not yet been approved but recently completed a successful Phase III clinical trial. Approval 
is likely to be granted in the first quarter of next year. See Adam Feuerstein, Alnylam’s Rare Disease Drug Shines in 
Trial, Paving Way for a Brand-New Class of Medicines, STAT NEWS (Sept. 20, 2017), 
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6 Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 297, 361 (2018) (describing the informational nature of precision 
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commercially developing university research and sublicensing university IP to others. 7  This 
creates an uneasy tension between the public missions of universities and the commercial motives 
of surrogates, particularly universities’ goals of producing and disclosing scientific information, 
and surrogates’ goals of exploiting that information for commercial gain.8 
This essay examines the challenges that surrogate licensing poses for the future of precision 
medicine. It begins by providing a brief summary of precision medicine and its recent 
developments. Next, it provides an overview of university patenting and the shift toward surrogate 
licensing. It then explores some of the difficulties concerning surrogate licensing in the context of 
precision medicine and, later, suggests modified licensing approaches and best practices that may 
better promote scientific discovery, the development of human therapies, and overall social 
welfare. Lastly, the essay discusses some larger doctrinal and theoretical implications arising from 
surrogate licensing in informationally intensive fields, like precision medicine. 
I. PRECISION MEDICINE 
Ironically, “precision medicine” itself is an imprecise term, a flexible phrase used to 
incorporate a host of therapies and diagnostics considered to be the “next generation” of medicine.9 
Nonetheless, the most accurate understanding of precision medicine—and the one used in this 
essay—defines precision medicine as “precisely tailored therapies to subcategories of disease, 
often defined by genomics.”10 The thrust of precision medicine is largely informational: it unites 
basic scientific information, patient-specific data, and algorithms that allow physicians to diagnose 
and treat the root causes of a patient’s condition.11 
Precision medicine treatments thus focus on an individual’s “genetic, biomarker, phenotypic, 
or psychosocial characteristics that distinguish a given patient from other patients with similar 
clinical presentations.” 12  For example, Keytruda’s new indication focuses not on a specific 
diagnosis, but on the existence of and level of expression of a particular protein, PD-L1, in patients’ 
tumors.13 Practically speaking, this means that each patient’s biopsy undergoes diagnostic testing 
to measure levels of PD-L1. 14  Where PD-L1 is present in sufficient quantities, Keytruda is 
indicated for treatment, independent of the broader type of cancer diagnosed or of the original 
location of the tumor.15 This stands in stark contrast to traditional cancer therapy that largely 
focuses on broad categories such as the organ in which cancer was found, e.g., “breast cancer” for 
                                                 
7 Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 
698, 698 (2017). 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 Adam A. Friedman, Anthony Letai, David E. Fisher & Keith T. Flaherty, Precision Medicine for Cancer with 
Next-Generation Functional Diagnostics, 15 NATURE REV. CANCER 747, 747 (2015); J. Larry Jameson & Dan L. 
Longo, Precision Medicine—Personalized, Problematic, and Promising, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2229, 2229 (2015) 
(questioning the cost savings of precision medicine). 
10 Ashley, supra note 4, at 2119. 
11 See Price II, supra note 5, at 421 (examining the role of “black box” algorithms in precision medicine); Sherkow, 
supra note 6. 
12 Jameson & Longo, supra note 9, at 2229. 
13 Id. 
14 List of Cleared or Approved Companion Diagnostic Devices (In Vitro and Imaging Tools), FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/ucm301431.htm  (last 




tumors found in the breast.16 Treating cancer in this fashion—by assessing and targeting particular 
molecular variants in individual patients—stands as the quintessential example of precision 
medicine, medicine using “molecular scalpels” rather than simplistic clinical presentations of 
constellations of symptoms.17 In a similar vein, Alnylam’s patisiran product is claimed to silence 
the expression of a defective copy of a specific gene, TTR, that causes a form of amyloidosis.18 
And, perhaps most impressively, Novartis’s Kymriah consists of a modified form of a patient’s 
own white blood cells, uniquely tailored to that patient’s tumor genetic profile.19 
Techniques such as these come on the heels of an explosion of information on human 
molecular genetics, beginning with the Human Genome Project and continuing today through a 
multitude of decentralized next-generation DNA sequencing efforts.20 As a result, there have been 
numerous initiatives recently establish to bring precision medicine to the fore. Most notably, the 
National Institutes of Health established, in 2015, a Precision Medicine Initiative (the human 
cohort development portion of which is now known as the “All of Us” program), a long-term 
research project aimed at funding research directed to “detecting, measuring, and analyzing a wide 
range of biomedical information—including molecular, genomic, cellular, clinical, behavioral, 
physiological, and environmental parameters.”21 Relatedly, the 21st Century Cures Act (2016) has 
established a Cancer Moonshot, a precision medicine program aimed ambitiously at curing cancer 
within a decade (or, at least, establishing a broad informational knowledge base to help).22 Besides 
these federal efforts, individual states such as California have established their own precision 
medicine initiatives, as have research institutions, like Columbia University and the University of 
Utah.23 But at their core, all of these research programs are similar: public-private molecular 
biology research imbued with the hope of translating genetic knowledge into clinical, commercial 
therapies.24 
II. UNIVERSITY PATENTING AND SURROGATE LICENSING 
The enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 and the subsequent rise of the biotechnology 
industry have made academic research institutions the gatekeepers for many foundational 
biotechnology discoveries and their accompanying patents. 25  Today, the paths of major 
“breakthroughs” in biotechnology routinely run through academic research institutions and their 
                                                 
16 D. Heim, J. Budczies, A. Stenzinger, D. Treue, P. Hufnagl, C. Denkert, M. Dietel & F. Klauschen, Cancer 
Beyond Organ and Tissue Specificity: Next-Generation-Sequencing Gene Mutation Data Reveal Complex Genetic 
Similarities Across Major Cancers, 135 INT’L J. CANCER 2362, 2362 (2014). 
17 PETER W. HUBER, THE CURE IN THE CODE 85 (2013). 
18 See Feuerstein, supra note 3. 
19  Highlights of Prescribing Information (Aug. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Kymriah label], 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/%20CellularGeneTherapyProducts/ApprovedProducts/UC
M573941.pdf. 
20 See Jorge L. Contreras, Constructing the Genome Commons in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 99 (Brett 
M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (discussing the Human Genome Project); 
Sherkow, supra note 6, at 17 (discussing recent efforts). 
21 Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 793, 794 
(2015). 
22 Sherkow, supra note 6, at 2–3 (explaining the Cancer Moonshot program). 
23 California Initiative to Advance Precision Medicine, http://www.ciapm.org; Precision Medicine at Columbia 
University, https://precisionmedicine.columbia.edu; CCTS Precision Medicine, 
http://medicine.utah.edu/ccts/precision-medicine/ . 
24 Collins & Varmus, supra note 211, at 794 (noting the goal of creating “new therapies”). 
25 Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Bayh–Dole Beyond Borders, 4 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 282 (2017). 
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patent estates.26 As in other areas of academic research, research regarding precision medicine has 
led to significant patent holdings by universities and other research institutions.27  
The promises and perils of university patenting have been well-documented.28 On the positive 
side of the ledger, university patenting encourages academic scientists to study “translational” 
technologies—technologies with immediate or near-term practical impact.29 University patenting 
also provides academic institutions with an additional revenue stream that, ideally, can be 
redeployed to serve education and fund further research.30 On the negative side of the ledger, some 
argue that university patenting “force[s] US taxpayers to ‘pay twice’ for patented products: once 
when they fund the initial grant, and again when they pay supra-competitive prices for the patented 
product.”31 University patents may also threaten cross-institutional collaboration; skew internal 
funding, advancement, and promotion decisions; and ultimately stymie follow-on research if 
enforced against other academic institutions.32 Whatever the policy considerations, since Bayh-
Dole, universities and other research institutions have been obtaining patents in significant 
numbers, particularly in the biotechnology area.33 
Biotechnology’s marriage of academic and commercial interests has led universities and 
research institutions to employ a range of methods for commercializing the technologies that they 
patent. Some university research may be sponsored directly by industrial collaborators, which 
obtain preferential rights in any technology resulting from that research. 34  Other university 
research may be licensed directly by the university, commonly through a technology licensing or 
technology transfer office, to companies granted rights to exploit the technology, usually in 
                                                 
26 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1666 (1996) (describing this phenomenon). 
27 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 258–259 (2015) 
(discussing historical trends with respect to diagnostic patents); Dianne Nicol, Tania Bubela, Don Chambers,  Jan 
Charbonneau,  Christine Critchley, Joanne Dickinson, Jennifer Fleming, Alex W. Hewitt, Jane Kaye, Jonathon 
Liddicoat Rebekah McWhirter, Margaret Otlowski, Nola M. Ries, Loane Skene, Cameron Stewart, Jennifer Wagner 
& Nik Zeps, Precision Medicine: Drowning in a Regulatory Soup?, 3 J. L. BIOSCI. 281, 298 (2016) (noting patents in 
this area); Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered Biomedical Data Silos, 92 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1641, 1646 (2016) (describing the fragmentation of such rights in this area). But see W. Nicholson 
Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1401–1405 (2016) (discussing 
the impotence of patents to incentivize precision medicine research); Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: 
Preserving the Future of Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1906–1922 (2016) (describing the 
difficulty of getting patents in this area). 
28 See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 1–3 (listing praises and criticisms); Wendy H. Schacht, 
CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL32076, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy and the Commercialization 
of Technology (2012). 
29 Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 2 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 52cm27 (2010) 
(describing this policy objective). But see Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Has the Bayh-Dole Act Compromised 
Basic Research?, 40 RES. POL’Y 1077, 1077 (2011) (empirically refuting this claim). 
30 Rosa Grimaldi, Martin Kenney, Donald S. Siegel & Mike Wright, 30 Years After Bayh–Dole: Reassessing 
Academic Entrepreneurship, 40 RES. POL’Y 1045, 1045 (2011) (“[T]here is the potential for promoting technology 
commercialization and generating revenue for the university, which is typically re-invested in academic research”). 
31 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 283; see also Schacht, supra note 28, at 14–15. 
32 Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR: Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172, 172–173 (2016). 
33 See, e.g., Brady Huggett & Kathryn Paisner, University Biotech Patenting 2013, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 512 
(2014). 
34 See Yong S. Lee, The Sustainability of University-Industry Research Collaboration: An Empirical Assessment, 
25 J. TECH. TRANSFER 111, 122–123 (2000) (assessing these relationships). 
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exchange for a royalty based on sales.35 But a third, and increasingly popular, mode of university 
technology commercialization is the creation of a new company (a “spinoff” or “spinout”) 
specifically designed for the purpose of commercializing a particular portfolio of the university’s 
technologies and IP. Both the university and the researchers responsible for the relevant 
technologies often retain an equity ownership stake in the spinout company, which then obtains a 
license of the relevant IP from the university.36 
University spinouts are not new; they have been formed to commercialize academic research 
for more than a century, and have grown substantially in popularity in the wake of the Bayh-Dole 
Act. 37 According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), U.S. and 
Canadian universities formed more than 11,000 start-up companies between 1994 and 2015, 
contributing to economic growth, job creation, and technology dissemination.38 Yet, commercial 
product development and IP licensing are not traditionally part of universities’ larger translational 
research efforts. Ideally then, spinouts enable universities to allocate the responsibility for 
technology commercialization to external professionals, freeing university researchers to perform 
basic research.39 In that vein, spinouts appear to provide an efficient vehicle for raising external 
capital to fund the translation of scientific discoveries in university laboratories into marketable 
products.40 Notable university spinouts over the years have included Google (Stanford University), 
Bose (MIT), and Myriad Genetics (University of Utah).41 
Many spinouts leave the university free to license IP to other companies, for other applications, 
as the university and its researchers see fit.42 But one variant of this spinout approach uses the 
spinout as a “surrogate” for the university’s broader licensing authority.43 In a typical transaction 
of this nature, the surrogate takes an exclusive license to the university’s technology, with the 
charge simultaneously to move the technology toward commercial development, through its own 
efforts but also through sublicensing the IP to others.44 In prior work, we termed this licensing 
approach “surrogate licensing”: the spinout company acts as a surrogate for the university, 
standing in the university’s shoes for purposes of commercializing and sublicensing university 
IP.45 A significant, recent example of surrogate licensing exists with respect to the IP covering 
CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology. Separately, the University of California (UC) and the 
Broad Institute (a joint effort of Harvard, MIT, and Harvard-affiliated research hospitals) have 
                                                 
35 See generally Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Jeffrey S. Carter-Johnson & Jorge L. Contreras, University Research and 
Licensing, in BIOINFORMATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE POST-GENOME ERA 98–
99 (Jorge L. Contreras & A. James Cuticchia eds., 2013). 
36 See id. at 99–100; see also Pinaki Nandan Pattnaik & Satyendra C. Pandey, University Spinoffs: What, Why, and 
How?, 4 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 44, 44 (2014). 
37 See Jorge Contreras, Kate Eavis, & Susan Newell, The Dizzying Rise of University Spinouts, TORNADO INSIDER, 
Oct. 2002, at 25 (noting the establishment of Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company by Charles Darwin’s son in 
1881 as a spinout from Cambridge University). 
38 ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY FY2015 2 (2016). 
39 See Lee, supra note 34, at 121–122 (discussing the benefits of spinouts to universities). 
40 See id. 
41  From the Garage to the Googleplex, GOOGLE, https://perma.cc/P7NJ-RZFT; Myriad Genetics, TVC, 
https://perma.cc/PW9A-ERZN. 
42 See Jon C. Sandelin, Dealing with Spinout Companies, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH 
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1271, 1275 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) 
(describing university practice in sublicensing when granting spinouts nonexclusive licenses). 
43 See, e.g., Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 698 (coining the term “surrogate licensing” and noting its 
appearance in the CRISPR context). 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
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exclusively licensed each of their foundational CRISPR patent estates to surrogates: UC to Caribou 
Biosciences and the Broad Institute to Editas Medicine.46 
What differentiates surrogates from ordinary spinouts is the breadth of the university’s 
delegation of its IP. In some cases, the field of research ceded by the university to its surrogate is 
practically universal. In 2007, for example, Harvard University formed Nano Terra, Inc. for the 
purpose of overseeing the commercialization and sublicensing of more than fifty foundational 
nanotechnology patents developed by pre-eminent Harvard chemist George Whitesides.47 The 
patents covered a variety of nanotechnology innovations with applications in industries ranging 
from advanced materials to avionics to chemicals to consumer products—broad enough to conjure 
the “specter . . . [of a] patent thicket . . . in the minds of innovators in this industry.”48 
In the case of CRISPR-Cas9, the field ceded to the research institutions’ surrogates 
encompasses every conceivable application—in the case of UC’s license to Caribou—or, as with 
Editas, every CRISPR-based human therapy directed to any of the 19,000-plus human genes.49 In 
either instance, the CRISPR-Cas9 surrogate licenses are so vast as to allow single, for-profit 
entities to lay claim to a broad universe of the technology’s applications in treating human 
disease.50 In addition, commercial applications for CRISPR extend beyond human therapies and 
into the realms of diagnostics, gene screening platforms, and agricultural applications.51 To the 
extent that universities abdicate their educational and public missions to for-profit surrogate 
companies, surrogate licensing casts in stark relief the distinction between universities’  core 
missions as educational institutions and research enterprises and their commercial aspirations. 
III. CONCERNS SURROUNDING SURROGATE LICENSING AND PRECISION MEDICINE 
Given that precision medicine is likely to advance through information sharing and openness, 
designating for-profit surrogate companies as gatekeepers for university IP presents several policy 
challenges. These include tensions between disclosure and secrecy, the “bottlenecking” of 
commercial research, contributing to the link between IP and rising health care costs, and the 
erosion of universities’ missions as disseminators of information. We discuss each these concerns 
in turn. 
A. Disclosure versus Secrecy 
Precision medicine and academic research are largely aligned when it comes to information 
policy: both thrive on the liberal, broad, and open disclosure of information. Universities, of 
course, implicitly—and, in some cases, explicitly—inure themselves with the duty to develop and 
                                                 
46 See id. Editas’s license is limited to the field of human therapeutics; Caribou’s license has no field restriction. 
But Caribou has, in turn, exclusively sublicensed human therapeutic applications to Intellia Therapeutics, a publicly-
traded corporation that was also formed by University of California to exploit CRISPR technologies. 
47 See Barnaby J. Feder, Harvard Is Licensing More than 50 Patents to a Nanotechnology Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jun. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/technology/04nano.html. Scientists, including former scientists 
turned lawyers, may be familiar with Whitesides from his seminal primer on how to write a good scientific paper. 
George M. Whitesides, Whitesides’ Group: Writing a Paper, 16 ADVANCED MATERIALS 1375 (2004). Note: JLC 
served as outside legal counsel to Nano Terra.  
48 Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 621 (2005). 
49 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 698. 
50 Id. 
51 See Jennifer A. Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-
Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1258096-1, 1258096-7 (2014). 
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disseminate information to the public.52 Precision medicine operates in a similar vein. The raw 
materials required to bring precision medicine from the laboratory to the clinic are genetic and 
other health-related data—data often developed through academic research.53 The disclosure of 
that data—publicly, through government-funded resources such as GenBank, dbSNP, dbGaP and 
ClinSeq, or even privately, through proprietary databases such as canCORS—drives the 
discoveries that, when applied to patients, constitute the best form of precision medicine.54 By 
contrast, precision medicine crafted under the cloak of secrecy or through impenetrable “black 
box” algorithms raise a multitude of concerns: scientific irreproducibility, a lack of patient 
autonomy, and even negative public health consequences.55 
Openness and access, however, are not primary goals for surrogate companies. Surrogates—
running in competitive races to develop therapeutic products—may conclude that secrecy is more 
valuable than disclosure. For example, Myriad Genetics, the exclusive licensee of breast-cancer 
risk diagnostic patents from the University of Utah and others, offers a recent example. During the 
course of its diagnostic work, Myriad developed a database of rare variants of the breast and 
ovarian cancer risk genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, with unknown clinical significance—“variants of 
unknown significance” or VUSs.56 Concluding that such a database was far more valuable as a 
trade secret than an open platform, Myriad limited access to it beginning in 2004, leading to public 
criticism, including a brief, statement of concern from the European Society for Human Genetics.57 
Relatedly, even where surrogates have committed to data sharing—either at the behest of their 
parent institutions or of their own accord—they have little incentive to standardize their datasets 
for sharing and cross-licensing purposes.58 Difficulties in establishing Hetionet—a cross-platform 
dataset of cancer genomics information—provide an elucidating example. There, Hetionet’s lead 
researcher, Daniel Himmelstein, faced competing difficulties: making twenty-eight datasets 
technically interoperable with one another and obtaining sublicenses from each dataset’s owner to 
use one in connection with others.59 These problems led to at least one dataset being left out of 
Hetionet’s larger platform, with three still floating in legal limbo.60  
This tension between disclosure and secrecy as profit-maximizing strategies raises what 
Jonathan M. Barnett calls the “host’s dilemma”: whether to deploy the “strategic forfeiture” of 
informational goods when faced with the uncertainty of a technology’s future scale and adoption.61 
One traditional hedge against the dilemma—and the one largely employed by surrogates, today—
has been the protection of information using a slate of IP protections: copyrights, trade secrets, and 
                                                 
52 John C. Scott, The Mission of the University: Medieval to Postmodern Transformations, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 
30–33 (2006). 
53  NAT’N RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’N ACAD., TOWARDS PRECISION MEDICINE: BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE 
NETWORK FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND A NEW TAXONOMY OF DISEASE 34–36 (2011). 
54 Samuel J. Aronson & Heidi L. Rehm, Building the Foundation for Genomics in Precision Medicine, 526 
NATURE 336, 337 (2015). 
55 See Conley et al., supra note 5, at 613–616; Price, supra note 5, at 421. 
56 Conley et al., supra note 5, at 600, 612–616. 
57 Id. at 614; Privately Owned Genetic Databases May Hinder Diagnosis and Bar the Way to the Arrival of 
Personalised Medicine, EUR. SOC’Y HUM. GENETICS (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.eshg.org/477.0.html.   
58 Jorge L. Contreras & Jerome H. Reichman, Sharing by Design: Data and Decentralized Commons, 350 SCIENCE 
1312 (2015); see also Christi J. Guerrini, Amy L. McGuire, & Mary A. Majumder, Myriad Take Two: Can Genomic 
Databases Remain Secret?, 356 SCIENCE 586, 586 (2017),. 
59 Simon Oxenham, Legal Maze Threatens to Slow Data Science, 536 NATURE 16, 16 (2016). 
60 Id. 
61 Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2011).  
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data protection rules.62 This allows surrogates to selectively parcel off information, lot by lot, if 
needed, but also to freely give it away in other cases.63  
This hedge may run counter to universities’ larger commitments to the field of precision 
medicine if placed in the hands of surrogate licensees. If later developments in a surrogate’s field 
mark open-data models as the path to riches, then this tension is largely loosened; the surrogate’s 
interests may very well be aligned with its parent university’s values. But if that does not come to 
pass—if profit-maximization is achieved through secrecy and exclusivity—surrogates have 
incentives, if not legal duties, to restrict access to their information from downstream competitors. 
This is all the more complicated—and difficult to square with universities’ broader commitments 
to spreading knowledge—if the surrogate hedges by parceling off some information as public 
while restricting other information as proprietary. The initial broad assignment of IP rights to the 
surrogate raises a host’s dilemma in ways that would not exist if these rights were retained by the 
university. Using surrogate licensors to further precision medicine research is, in some senses, an 
act of irony: the establishment of for-profit licensing structures may ultimately restrict information 
in an effort to commercially develop it. 
B. Commercial Research Bottlenecks 
It is not uncommon in the precision medicine context for patent holders—both commercial 
developers and universities—to license their patents on exclusive terms, granting, for example, an 
exclusive license to a downstream company to develop a particular therapeutic product based on 
a particular genetic target.64 This is not altogether unreasonable; precision medicine is fraught with 
uncertainty and failure.65 Translating what works on LocusZoom—a popular statistical genetics 
program—into what works in the clinic requires clinical validation and testing, often at an expense 
of hundreds of millions of dollars.66 Downstream developers typically balk at conducting such 
work without some form of exclusive licensing to allow them to recoup these significant up-front 
costs.67 
The potential problem with this arrangement—both in the precision medicine context and 
others—lies in how much exclusivity is granted. Exclusive rights beyond those necessary to 
develop a particular product are a deadweight loss: society will pay a higher price for the end 
therapeutic product beyond that necessary to bring it to market.68 If a nonexclusive license would 
have sufficed, by contrast, this means that other developers did not have the opportunity to enter—
                                                 
62 See id. at 1910–1913 (discussing the dilemma in relation to IBM’s gargantuan patent estate). 
63 See id. Perhaps ironically, this is notable in the CRISPR context: both UC and the Broad Institute are depositors 
with AddGene, a non-profit repository of CRISPR constructs, made cheaply available to academic researchers, and 
licensed to them nonexclusively using a standard license, the Uniform Biologic Materials Transfer Agreement. See 
Sherkow, supra note 32, at 173. 
64 Carter-Johnson et al., supra note 35, at 102–103. 
65 See Cassandra Willyard, Auctioning the Cure, 17 NATURE MED. 528, 529 (2011) (discussing the commonness 
of exclusive licenses in precision medicine). 
66 Nicholas J. Schork, Time for One-Person Trials, 520 NATURE 609, 611 (2015) (“[C]onventional phase III 
[clinical] trials . . . can cost between $100 million and $700 million per drug.”). 
67 See Willyard, supra note 65, at 529 (interviewing patent licensors for such a perspective). 
68 Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for Bayh–Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 284 
(2016),;  Jerome H. Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating 
the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 252 (2009) (“[A]s James Love famously observed, deadweight loss tends 
over time to become dead bodies.”). 
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or at least attempt to enter—the product market.69 By the same token, exclusivity also deprives the 
public of the benefit of having multiple firms “race” to develop and test new products, the diversity 
of pharmaceutical compositions or dosing regimens for the same product, and the differences in 
approved indications or treatment subclasses. 70  Broad exclusive licenses can thus bottleneck 
commercial research.71 
Exclusive surrogate licenses pose particular problems in the precision medicine context. 
Precision medicine therapy often operates on few genes—if not individual gene variants—as 
evidenced by Keytruda, Kymriah, and patisiran. Keytruda works by targeting a single protein, PD-
L1, expressed on tumor surfaces.72 Patisiran consists of an RNA molecule that binds, specifically, 
to a single variant of the TTR gene.73 And Kymriah is truly specific—a cell therapy designed for 
each separate instance of treatment to recognize a single variant of CD-19, and unique to each 
individual patient.74 Surrogate licenses, however, have been drawn to human therapeutics writ 
large—to all 19,000-plus known human genes and their attendant medical conditions both known 
and unknown.75 Even with the responsibility to sublicense the technology to other competitors, 
this exclusive grant is far beyond what any surrogate requires to be “induced” to engage in the 
commercial development of a precision therapy.76 Competitive, commercial research in related 
genetic areas—therapies directed to different alleles of the same gene or targets directed to 
differing points in a protein’s cellular pathway—stand to suffer.77 
The common rejoinder to this criticism is that surrogate companies are expected (and have 
incentives) to sublicense their rights to others in areas not currently being pursued by the 
surrogate.78 This responsibility—at its best—should therefore leave the field open to the rest of 
the industry, negating the impact of the interposition of the surrogate between the university and 
                                                 
69 Ayre & Ouellette, supra note 68, at 284. This assumes, of course, that other products cannot be substitutes, an 
assumption that—frankly—may not be an accurate description of reality. In truth, this is an immensely complex 
question that turns, in part, on a product’s indication, physician off-label prescription, and second-order pricing 
controls, like rebates and insurance coverage—to name just a few of the inputs that go into the question of whether 
two therapeutic products are really “substitutable” in any economic sense. For purposes of this paper, and for 
simplicity, we rest on the classical notion that the only true substitutes for a product are generic versions of the same 
product. 
70 See Emily Marden, Open Source Drug Development: A Path to More Accessible Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 217, 251–252 (2010) (comparing this “race” model in open source development to drug 
development, and noting that its advantages include “multiple decentralized nodes, minimizing space and equipment 
costs . . . [where] progress is made via the cumulative, potentially more creative, efforts of the participants”). 
71 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 698. 
72 Keytruda Approval Letter, supra note 1. 
73 See David Adams, Ole B. Suhr, Peter J. Dyck, William J. Litchy, Raina G. Leahy, Jihong Chen, Jared Gollob & 
Teresa Coelho, Trial Design and Rationale for APOLLO, a Phase 3, Placebo-Controlled Study of Patisiran in Patients 
with Hereditary ATTR Amyloidosis with Polyneuropathy, 17 BMC NEUROLOGY 181, 181 (2017). 
74 Kymriah Approval Letter, supra note 2. 
75 See, e.g., Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 698 (documenting this in the CRISPR context). 
76 See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 
1597–98 (2011) (tying the inducement of a patent to deadweight loss in its absence). 
77 See Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 699 (describing these difficulties in the CRISPR CAR-T space); 
Charlie Schmidt, Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 273, 273 (2007) (describing Alnylam’s 
licensing position for RNAi). 
78 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 699; see also Information About Licensing CRISPR Genome Editing 
Systems, BROAD INSTITUTE,  https://www.broadinstitute.org/partnerships/office-strategic-alliances-and-
partnering/information-about-licensing-crispr-genome-edi [hereinafter Broad Institute Licensing Statement]. 
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the rest of the industry.79 But this does not hold in practice. The surrogate arrangement—by 
design—makes surrogates competitors with the same companies to which they are expected to 
offer sublicenses.80 This creates some obvious conflicts between surrogates and their potential 
sublicensees that counsel against favorable licensing: restrictions on entry, patent litigation, and 
former employee non-compete agreements are but a few examples.81  
These conflicts are particularly problematic in the context of precision medicine, where 
multiple companies often pursue different strategies to tackle the same genetic problem. Juno 
Pharmaceuticals, for example—a sublicensee of the Broad Institute’s surrogate Editas—has been 
engaged in patent litigation with Kite Pharmaceuticals concerning one particular aspect of 
chimeric antigen receptor T-cell therapy, or CAR-T, the underlying technology behind Kymriah.82 
And BioMarin Pharmaceutical and Sarepta Therapeutics—two companies exploring differing 
approaches to modifying DMD, a gene, certain variants of which give rise to forms of muscular 
dystrophy—have fought fiercely over patent claims to broaden implementations of their respective 
therapies. 83  These cases suggest that surrogates, far from treating competitors as friendly 
occupants of unrelated therapeutic niches, view their rivals as challengers to their territories. In the 
extreme, surrogates’ quashing of competition runs the risk of reducing overall welfare.84 
To their credit, some research institutions have attempted to guard against such behavior. The 
Broad Institute, for example, has reserved for itself an “escape hatch” of sorts in its license to 
Editas.85 Were a competitor of Editas to petition the Broad Institute to license aspects of the 
CRISPR patents developed by Editas, Editas could not prevent the transaction unless it 
demonstrated it was actively developing a therapy concerning the same target or had plans to do 
                                                 
79 See Broad Institute Licensing Statement, supra note 78 (“The goal of our inclusive innovation model is to enable 
Editas to devote sufficient investment to develop CRISPR-based genome editing technology to treat human diseases, 
while supporting broad development of medicines to reach many patients.”).  
To offer a broader, numerical example: Suppose that there are 100 realistic drug targets contained within the field 
and twenty companies that could feasibly develop them. If the university were to grant licenses directly to qualified 
developers and assuming a superhuman technology licensing office, it could conceivably license all 100 targets to the 
twenty industry participants. This will result in R&D programs for each of the 100 targets. Now, however, suppose 
that the university licenses all 100 targets to one surrogate company. The surrogate believes that it can successfully 
develop five targets. It is thus in the surrogate’s interest to sublicense the remaining ninety-five targets to other industry 
participants, each of which is also equipped to develop five targets. The net result is that all 100 targets are licensed, 
and overall welfare remains the same. 
80 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 699. 
81 Id. To further our numerical example, let us suppose these conflicts would potentially reduce the overall pool of 
licensees from twenty to, say, fifteen (a reduction of 25%). As a result, the surrogate might not be able to license all 
ninety-five remaining targets for development.  Reducing the licensable targets proportionally, let us assume that only 
seventy-one targets (75% of the ninety-five remaining targets) are licensed. While the competitive advantage to the 
surrogate may be increased, overall social welfare is reduced because twenty-four targets are no longer being 
developed. 
82 See Complaint, Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-6496 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017). 
Interestingly, Juno’s license from Editas actually operates as a cross-license to Juno’s CAR-T technology, raising 
additional potential conflicts concerning the breadth of its license. 
83 See Complaint, Univ. of W. Austr. v. Academisch Ziekenhuis Leiden, No. 1:16-cv-109 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2016) 
(listing Sarepta and Biomarin as co-plaintiffs and co-defendants, respectively). 
84 Continuing our numerical example: Assume that instead of reserving for itself the five targets that it can feasibly 
develop, the surrogate decides to reserve for itself ten targets, even though development programs for the last five 
cannot possibly be commenced for at least several years. This brings the total number of targets available to the field 
down from ninety-five to ninety, at best delaying the development of five potentially valuable therapies. 
85 See Broad Institute Licensing Statement, supra note 78. 
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so.86 But “active development,” not to mention plans to develop, are boundless concepts subject 
to the vagaries of science, funding, and the manner in which investigators view their research at 
the time. Furthermore, the license is unclear as to how disputes concerning the interpretation of 
“active development” are to be resolved.87 The Broad Institute’s “clawback” model appears, on its 
face, to be a good faith attempt to check the indulgences of its surrogate licensee, but it is 
incomplete and leaves significant discretion to the surrogate itself. 
Lastly, surrogate licensing, even if well-intentioned and narrowly tailored today, may become 
overly broad tomorrow as the science of precision medicine develops. Novartis’s approval of 
Kymriah, for example, comes on the heels of failures by Juno, including the unexpected death of 
a number of subjects in clinical trials.88 As CAR-T develops, researchers are beginning to learn 
the complexities of genetically optimizing the technology, put on kaleidoscopic display by the 
Adaptive Immune Receptor Repertoire (AIRR), a robust database of such variation.89 An exclusive 
license to a single developer to use CAR-T against, say, the CD28 protein—while seemingly 
narrow several years ago—may now seem like a massive fiefdom. It may therefore be unclear how 
scientifically narrow a particular precision medicine product must be to develop future therapies, 
and broad, exclusive surrogate licenses do this little favor. Surrogates are simply ill-equipped—
and poorly incentivized—to assess the appropriate level of exclusivity for tomorrow’s downstream 
applications.90 
C.  Institutional Mission Erosion 
If the development of precision medicine is the ideal union between universities’ educational 
and research missions, surrogate licensing seems to erode them both. Most research universities 
and institutions operate under charters that embody a variety of missions directed to the public 
good: the education of students, the expansion of knowledge through research, the alleviation of 
human suffering, the fostering of economic growth, or other means for improving overall social 
welfare. 91  These public-spirited goals affect many aspects of institutional governance and 
                                                 
86 See id. 
87 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 700. 
88  Alex Lash, After Trial Deaths, Juno Pivots and Scraps Lead CAR-T Therapy, EXOME, (Mar. 1, 2017) 
https://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2017/03/01/after-trial-deaths-juno-pivots-and-scraps-lead-car-t-therapy/. 
89 Felix Breden, Eline T. Luning Prak, Bjoern Peters, Florian Rubelt, Chaim A. Schramm, Christian E. Busse, 
Jason A. Vander Heiden, Scott Christley, Syed Ahmad Chan Bukhari, Adrian Thorogood, Frederick A. Matsen IV, 
Yariv Wine, Uri Laserson, David Klatzmann, Daniel C. Douek, Marie-Paule Lefranc, Andrew M. Collins, Tania 
Bubela, Steven H. Kleinstein, Corey T. Watson, Lindsay G. Cowell, Jamie K. Scott & Thomas B. Kepler, 
Reproducibility and Reuse of Adaptive Immune Receptor Repertoire Data, 8 FRONTIERS IMMUNOLOGY art. 1418, at 1 
(2017). 
90 Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 700. Beyond the CRISPR setting, another telling example concerns the 
licensing of DNA diagnostic patents. The University of Michigan, which isolated and patented the CFSR gene 
responsible for cystic fibrosis, broadly licensed its CFSR patent at minimal cost. The University of Utah, which 
obtained patent rights covering the BRCA1/2 genes indicating breast and ovarian cancer, exclusively licensed its 
patents covering these genes to Myriad Genetics, which monopolized the market for BRCA diagnostic testing for 
fifteen years (until the patents were invalidated by the Supreme Court). See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE INTEGRATION OF GENETIC 
TECHNOLOGIES INTO HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH A PROGRESS REPORT AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY (Jan. 2009), 
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SACGHS%20Progress%20and%20Priorities%20Report%20to%
20HHS%20Secretary%20Jan%202009.pdf. 
91 See Scott, supra note 52, at 30–33. 
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operation, including the development and exploitation of IP. 92  As observed by the National 
Academies of Science, 
 
Universities have a lengthy track record of providing dynamic environments for generating 
new ideas and spurring innovation, and for moving advances in knowledge and technology 
into the commercial stream where they can be put to work for the public good . . . .93 
 
Along these lines, in 2007 a group of prominent research universities, including Harvard, MIT and 
UC Berkeley, developed a set of guidelines to reconcile university IP licensing practices with their 
public missions.94 The resulting document, In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in 
Licensing University Technology, addresses a broad range of university IP management and 
licensing issues, such as the preservation of academic research rights, meeting the medical needs 
of neglected populations, and promoting fair licensing principles to encourage their technologies’ 
broadest dissemination.95 The Nine Points document has now been signed by more than 100 
universities and research institutions around the world.96 
But Nine Points is an ideal, not a command, and universities have concurrently aspired to and 
violated its principles.97 What’s more, the Nine Points in no way bind university surrogates in letter 
or spirit. 98  It is expected, in some instances, for university licensees to develop university 
technology with an eye toward profit, indifferent to any social consequences. 99  Commercial 
licensees have, indeed, used university technology to develop tobacco products, surveillance 
dragnets, and instruments of war.100 Universities may wish to use the Nine Points principles to 
impose their values on licensees. But that—as with many university IP practices—depends on the 
desires of the licensees themselves. 
In that vein, surrogate companies in the precision medicine space are not constrained by these 
public missions. Surrogates’ decisions concerning which research to prioritize, how to protect their 
innovations, and to whom they should award sublicenses may not be not aligned with universities’ 
broader commitments to the public. Sublicenses to develop a precision therapy targeting a gene 
variant prevalent in affluent countries may not, in fact, best serve universities’ commitments to 
treat neglected populations of disease sufferers. But they may be profitable.101 Similarly, expensive 
                                                 
92 See In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology, ASSOCIATION OF 
UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS (AUTM) (Mar. 6, 2007) 
http://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/ 
Points_to_Consider.pdf [hereinafter Nine Points]. 
93 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 14 
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011). 
94 Nine Points, supra note 92. 
95 Id. 
96 Signatories, AUTM, https://www.autm.net/advocacy-topics/government-issues/principles-and-guidelines/nine- 
points-to-consider-when-licensing-university/ [https://perma.cc/RF5F-A7BE]. 
97 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORD. INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 611 
(2007) (noting that universities may be bad actors in the patent system despite their ideals). 
98 That is, the Nine Points apply only to universities—not their licensees. 
99 See Lemley, supra note 97, at 611.  
100 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,560,830 (claiming hybrid tobacco plants and assigned to North Carolina State 
University); U.S. Patent No. 7,095,027 (claiming an infrared remote sensing system for military applications, and 
assigned to the University of Central Florida Research Foundation, Inc.); U.S. Patent No. 7,609,743 (claiming a robust 
laser for military purposes, and assigned to the University of Central Florida Research Foundation, Inc.). 
101  See Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Patents, and the Public Health, 90 YALE J. BIOL. & MED. 607 (2017) 
(discussing this problem in the CRISPR context). 
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patent litigation and prosecution practice may run counter to universities’ desires to engage in 
precision medicine’s ideal of data-sharing. But paying for lawyers does preserve marketable 
value.102 Universities’ initial decisions to grant broad, exclusive licenses to surrogates is a first 
step—a significant one—in universities’ abdication of their responsibilities under the Nine Points 
for precision therapies. 
More granularly, the relationship between universities’ missions and surrogates’ development 
of precision therapies for low-income populations is particularly fraught. The Nine Points require 
that “[u]niversities should strive to construct licensing arrangements in ways that ensure that . . . 
underprivileged populations have low- or no-cost access to adequate quantities of . . . medical 
innovations.”103 This commitment—which arose after some public ire against universities that 
failed to constrain their profit-seeking licensees—now characterizes many university licensing 
deals in the pharmaceutical sector. 104 But these development and cost decisions for precision 
therapies lay at the feet of the surrogates, not their parent universities. Surrogates are entrusted to 
make decisions concerning whether development targets will focus on underprivileged populations 
or typically privileged ones. And surrogates ultimately decide whether and to what extent they will 
mediate cost arrangements of developed therapies for the poor.105 Surrogates may well act in the 
public interest in these regards. But they are obligated, as matter of first principles, to generate 
profits for their shareholders rather than hew to the public missions supported by documents like 
the Nine Points.106 
Granting surrogate licenses for the development of precision therapies may also erode 
universities’ broader educational missions. Universities often couch these aspirations in terms of 
the free and open dissemination of knowledge to the world.107 Columbia University’s Mission 
Statement, for example, states that it “expects all areas of the university to advance knowledge and 
learning at the highest level and to convey the products of its efforts to the world.”108 But surrogate 
licenses in the precision medicine context traditionally restrict this free and open exchange of 
information, especially for broader platform technologies. 109 In some cases surrogates vie to 
protect their valuable data as trade secrets. 110  And in others, surrogates impose significant 
restrictions on what data outside researchers can access and how the data can be used in further 
                                                 
102  See Sharon Begley, CRISPR Patent Fight: The Legal Bills Are Soaring, STAT NEWS (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/16/crispr-patent-fight-legal-bills-soaring/ [https://perma.cc/SGY3-RVG7] 
(quoting a representative from Editas as saying “Investing in intellectual property is one component how we are 
building the company to be a leader in genomic medicine.”). 
103 Nine Points, supra note 92, at 8 (Point 9). 
104 In 2001, Yale University came under intense pressure by its students, alumni and the public after licensing its 
patents covering the antiretroviral AIDS drug stavudine to Bristol-Myers Squibb, which refused to make the drug 
available to thousands of patients in Africa. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Yale Pressed to Help Cut Drug Costs in Africa, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2001). 
105 See Sherkow, supra note 101. 
106 Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 763, 790 (2004) (“By adopting for-profit corporate structures, universities choose a corporate structure explicitly 
intended for the private financial interests of shareholders, whether the shareholders are venture capitalists or the 
university itself. Further, for-profit corporate partners and shareholders in university spinoff corporations become 
participants in the core university function of education.”). 
107 Scott, supra note 52, at 30–33. 
108  University Mission Statement, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, https://www.columbia.edu/content/about-columbia 
[https://perma.cc/QHA3-JY6N]. 
109  Breden, et al., supra note 89, at 1 (cautioning against this problem); cf. Lemley, supra note 48, at 621 
(discussing this problem for platform nanotechnology). 
110 Guerrini, McGuire, & Majumder, supra note 58, at 586. 
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studies.111 As with Hetionet, these restrictions can detrimentally affect scientific education. 112 
Surrogates also have no obligation to engage in the most basic process of public education: 
publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals.113 Outside researchers are therefore deprived of 
the best opportunities to learn, test, and critique surrogates’ research. 114  Broad licenses to 
surrogates ultimately cast a pall over the bright lights of universities’ scientific and educational 
missions. 
D. Health Care Costs 
Universities may also be victims of their surrogates’ successes: by furthering the marketability 
of profitable precision therapies, surrogates’ development work may well contribute to increased 
health care costs. These increases are linked to a series of more complex issues governing drug 
pricing, therapeutic value, and insurance coverage.115 But surrogates—as opposed to restrictive 
university licensing—can exacerbate the rush to develop high-cost precision therapies.116 
It is important to understand, first, that while precision medicine seeks to improve clinical 
outcomes, such improvements do not necessarily bring cost savings.117 Patients that once had 
meager options to manage their illnesses may now have the opportunity to pay—in some instances, 
dearly—for treatment.118 In other cases, illnesses that were previously treated with inexpensive 
palliative care may now have expensive therapies that can manage or even cure their underlying 
etiologies.119 A telling example concerns fetal fibronectin: Prior to the development of a test for 
fetal fibronectin—a protein of some value in assessing the chances of preterm birth—expectant 
mothers were subject to a cheap, albeit inaccurate, vaginal exam, including a transvaginal cervical 
                                                 
111 Sherkow, supra note 6, at 356–57 (discussing canCORS). 
112 Oxenham, supra note 59, at 16. 
113 By way of example, a recent search on PubMed, the NIH’s scientific paper database, showed that Intellia 
Therapeutics—the exclusive sublicensee of Caribou Biosciences, UC Berkeley’s surrogate for CRISPR applications 
in humans—has only two scientific papers to its credit, neither about CRISPR. See Thomas J. Povsic, Timothey D. 
Henry, Jay H. Traverse, F. David Fortuin, Gary L. Schaer, Dean J. Kereiakes, Richard A Schatz, Andreas M. Zeiher, 
Christopher J. White, Duncan J. Stewart, E. Marc Jolicoeur, Theodore Bass, David A. Henderson, Patricia Dignacco, 
Ziangoiong Gu, Hussein R. Al-Khalidi, Candice Junge, Adel Nada & Douglas W. Losordo, The RENEW Trial: 
Efficacy and Safety of Intramyocardial Autologous CD34+ Cell Administration in Patients With Refractory Angina, 9 
JACC: CARDIOVASCULAR INTERVENTIONS 1576 (2016); see also Zhiji Ren, Isana Veksler-Lublinsky, David 
Morrissey, Victor Adams, Staufen Negatively Modulates MicroRNA Activity in Caenorhabditis elegans, 6 G3 1227 
(2016). 
114 See Spencer Phillips Hey & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Countering Imprecision in Precision Medicine, 353 SCIENCE 
448, 448  (2016) (arguing that precision medicine is only advanced through disclosure and validation). 
115 See Rachel Sachs, Nicholas Bagley & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Value-Based Pricing For Pharmaceuticals In The 
Trump Administration, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, (Apr. 27, 2017) 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170427.059813/full/ [https://perma.cc/4H4Q-J39J]  (discussing 
some of the many drug pricing levers). 
116 Sherkow, supra note 101101, at 4. 
117 See Joanna C.D. Willis & Graham M. Lord, Immune Biomarkers: The Promises and Pitfalls of Personalized 
Medicine, 15 NATURE REV. IMMUNOLOGY 323, 327 (2015) (“[N]ot all potential immune biomarkers will satisfy health 
economists in terms of attractive cost- benefit ratios.”). 
118 Id. (“[N]ovel therapeutic agents for which biomarkers are being developed are extremely expensive; a single 
course of ipilimumab for the treatment of melanoma costs approximately US $120,000.”). The current sticker price 
for Kymriah is $475,000. Sy Mukherjee, Is $475,000 Too High a Price for Novartis’s “Historic” Cancer Gene 
Therapy?, FORTUNE (Aug 31, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/08/31/novartis-kymriah-car-t-cms-price/ 
[http://perma.cc/T9J8-XGTL] . 
119 See Jameson & Longo, supra note 9, at 2229 (discussing precision medicine’s cost increases). 
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measurement.120 This standard intervention cost pennies per patient; the fetal fibronectin test, by 
contrast, cost one hospital system $225 per patient.121 To be clear, the value of precision medicine 
is a human one—improving health and saving lives—but its cost may be also be high. 
Developing precision medicine through surrogate companies—rather than direct university 
licensing—may exacerbate these cost increases. Surrogates, like other for-profit therapeutic 
developers, are strongly encouraged to develop revenue-maximizing therapeutic products—
therapies that afflict large numbers of patients who can afford treatment.122 Because surrogate 
licenses from universities do not, typically, include pricing controls, surrogates may chase 
therapies on which they can pin high price tags. 123  Two of the CRISPR surrogates—Editas 
Medicine and Intellia Therapeutics—provide illuminating examples. Editas’s primary research 
platform concerns Leber Congenital Amaurosis, a congenital form of blindness that affects 
between 3,000 and 6,000 Americans.124 At a cost of $100,000 per course of treatment, the therapy 
has a potential market of $3 billion. Other precision medicine ocular treatments—such as Spark 
Therapeutics’ soon-to-be-approved $1 million treatment for inherited retinal disease—could result 
in markets in the tens of billions.125 Intellia, meanwhile, has focused on curing sickle-cell anemia, 
an illness that afflicts roughly 100,000 Americans,126 and for which the few treatment options—
such as hydroxyurea—cost around $1.50 per 500 mg dose,127 which could yield large profits 
through its broad reach. 
Beyond this intersection, between clinical utility and commercial profitability, surrogates’ 
sublicensing agreements are also expected to be profit maximizing. In the precision medicine 
context, this may result in layers of sublicenses—each predicated, perhaps, on different genes or 
disease indications—and all of which are designed to return the maximum possible revenues upon 
product approval.128 Payers, therefore, would be paying drug prices set to maximize royalties on 
at least two fronts: the sublicense to the surrogate, and the surrogate’s license to the university.129 
As explored in a loosely analogous context, a series of profit-maximizing sublicenses can create 
systems of “royalty stacking,” ultimately creating end products far more expensive than their cost 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., A. Sullivan, N.A. Hueppchen & A.J. Satin, Cost Effectiveness of Bedside Fetal Fibronectin Testing 
Varies According to Treatment Algorithm, 10 J. MATERNAL FETAL MED. 380, 380 (2001). 
121 Id. 
122 See Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 700. 
123 Id. 
124 See Eye Diseases, EDITAS MEDICINE, http://www.editasmedicine.com/areas-of-research/eye-diseases 
[https://perma.cc/33SY-ZB9Y]; see also Rando Allikmets, Leber Congenital Amaurosis: A Genetic Paradigm, 25 
OPTHALMIC GENETICS 67, 67 (2004). 
125 See Emma Court, Spark Therapeutics’ Promising Gene Therapy for Vision Loss Could Cost $1 Million, 
MARKETWATCH, (Oct. 16, 2017 8:35 AM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/spark-therapeutics-promising-
gene-therapy-for-vision-loss-could-cost-1-million-2017-10-13 [https://perma.cc/XKK8-DUF7].  
126  Emily Mullin, Sickle-Cell Patients See Hope in CRISPR, MIT TECH. REV., Aug. 23, 2017, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608641/sickle-cell-patients-see-hope-in-crispr/ [https://perma.cc/Q6QY-
Z62S].  
127 Richard D. Moore, Samuel Charache, Michael L. Terrin, Franca B Barton & Samir K Ballas,  Cost-Effectiveness 
of Hydroxyurea in Sickle Cell Anemia, 64 AM. J. HEMATOLOGY 26, 28 (2000). 
128 Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992–1993 
(2007) (noting this phenomenon—royalty stacking—in the wireless communications and other technology markets). 
129 This assumes, of course, that the ultimate retail or sticker price paid by payers is a function of these inputs—
not simply a single profit maximizing price independent of input. We recognize this is a hotly contested issue in the 
health economics literature, but do not go into it in more detail here. 
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of development or production would suggest.130 Surrogates’ profit motivation in sublicensing, 
therefore, also has the potential to contribute to rising health care costs.131 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PATENT LICENSING IN PRECISION MEDICINE 
The issues raised by surrogate licensing for precision medicine should give research 
institutions cause to rethink such licenses. Given the potential value of precision therapies and 
universities’ broad patent estates in the field, we make several recommendations to better align 
university patenting licensing with the realities of commercially developing precision therapies: 
restrictions on exclusive licenses or “claw back” clauses; fair pricing requirements on end products 
developed from university patent grants; and commitments to data sharing. 
A. Exclusivity Restrictions and Claw Back Provisions 
When licensing precision medicine IP to for-profit companies, universities and other non-profit 
research institutions should ensure that they retain rights to make such technology available, in a 
manner necessary to fulfill their public missions. We believe this can be accomplished in two non-
mutually exclusive ways. The first concerns the restriction of exclusive licenses in the first 
instance. While surrogate licensing presents some potential efficiencies for university management 
of IP, as discussed above, these exclusive licenses can be overly broad—beyond any 
commensurate level of efficiency or inducement to develop a specific precision therapy.132 Solving 
this problem lies in constructively abandoning the surrogate model—granting companies only the 
exclusivity they need to develop a particular therapy. As a further inducement, such limitations 
could be coupled with rights of first refusal on other licenses for specific therapies, assuming the 
licensee can demonstrate that it is actually furthering development. In other instances, where it 
does appear that a licensee could effectively develop a technology with a nonexclusive license, 
universities should readily use such licenses, as Stanford and UCSF famously did for recombinant 
DNA technology patents in the 1980s.133 In the precision medicine field, nonexclusivity has the 
benefit of allowing other nonexclusive licenses elsewhere to ameliorate scientific or regulatory 
deficiencies in a single company’s approach to a specific genetic target or disease indication.134 
Parceling off licenses—exclusive or otherwise—at the university, rather than the surrogate level, 
better enables universities to fulfill their own public missions. 
But even with a surrogate licensing model, universities should structure their licenses to enable 
them to “claw back” disease indications or genes that are being insufficiently developed by the 
surrogate. In the CRISPR context, this is akin to the Broad Institute’s rights of “relicensing” with 
                                                 
130 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 128, at 1992–1993. 
131  Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On 
Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 307–308 (2010) 
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132 See Contreras & Sherkow, supra note 7, at 699. 
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134 Cf. Marden, supra note 70, at 271–272; Ayres & Ouellette, supra note 68 (proposing a “market test” to 
determine whether federally-funded discoveries should be licensed exclusively or non-exclusively);  Ana Santos 
Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 5 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (suggesting non-exclusive 
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Editas, its surrogate.135 At the same time, such claw back provisions—for what we think are 
obvious reasons—should not rest entirely on the surrogate’s discretion, nor be based solely on the 
surrogate’s own descriptions of the state of its work, or the promises of its success. Retaining an 
automatic right to reenter areas of the licensed field that the surrogate is not currently working 
could ensure that universities take seriously the stewardship of their IP, in a manner that is 
consistent with their public missions. 
B. Fair Pricing Requirements 
Particularly with respect to precision medicine, universities and other non-profit research 
institutions should ensure that their IP licensees are bound to price resulting products and 
treatments in a manner that reasonably affords access to patients. The current pricing system of 
precision therapies is profit-maximizing; untethered to real costs of the development of any given 
therapy.136 For non-essential goods, like video games and sports drinks, this has little effect on 
universities’ greater missions to the public.137 But for essential goods, like life-saving medical 
treatments, this brings universities’ greater ethical commitments to bear. Importantly, such ethical 
restrictions have been important features of university licensing in other areas. 138 The Broad 
Institute’s license of its CRISPR patents to Monsanto, for example, prohibits Monsanto from 
enforcing the use of its covered technology against individual farmers.139 Other university licenses, 
in line with the Nine Points (Point 9), require that pharmaceuticals be made available for 
compassionate use, or in developing countries. 140  In a similar vein, universities could—and 
should—require licensees of their precision medicine IP to ultimately sell their products at “fair” 
prices, however defined. 
Beyond individual cost concerns, there exist serious healthcare reimbursement and coverage 
concerns that restrictive price licensing could ameliorate. Glybera—a now-discontinued gene 
therapy that retailed for $1 million per patient while on the market—exemplifies these 
difficulties.141 This principle is especially important given that many precision therapies, such as 
Kymriah, now sell for upwards of $400,000 a year.142 These, frankly, are unsustainable prices for 
                                                 
135 Broad Institute Licensing Statement, supra note 78. At the same time, the terms of the clawback are imprecisely 
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138 See Christi J. Guerrini, Margaret A Curnutte, Jacob S Sherkow & Christopher T Scott, The Rise of the Ethical 
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https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/monsantocommitmentfarmsersandpatents.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC29-
N3AK]; see also Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 545–46 (2015) (discussing Monsanto’s 
pledge). 
140 See Nine Points, supra note 92. 
141 See Antonio Regalado, The World’s Most Expensive Medicine Is a Bust, MIT TECH. REV. (May 4, 2016) 
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long-term public-payer funding, even if they are currently what the market will bear.143 In their 
missions to the broader public, universities should ensure that products developed from their IP 
can be afforded by the public health system, writ large.144 Given that much precision medicine 
technology is developed through academic institutions, those institutions’ duty to better the public 
weal would be well-served by such restrictions.  
C. Data-Sharing Commitments 
When licensing precision medicine IP, universities and other non-profit research institutions 
should require that their licensees share any underlying research data with the scientific 
community. This first and foremost requires licensees to be involved in the scientific enterprise of 
publishing their results and broadly releasing underlying data for use by other researchers—
without significant restrictions.145 Some university licensees have indeed engaged in this practice, 
becoming significant contributors to the scientific literature. 146  At the same time, while we 
recognize that universities have both ethical and legal imperatives to maintain data integrity in 
ways that protect patient privacy, these concerns should not be a subtext for restricting the use of 
licensees’ data in subsequent research. Deidentifying data is, indeed, difficult but several excellent 
models of the practice, including the Vanderbilt Genome-Electronic Record project, exist and are 
ripe for adoption by licensees.147 Likewise, licensees should not—in an effort solely to preserve 
market value—restrict access to data more than their parent universities would. Given that many 
universities’ principal goals center on the dissemination of basic information, such data sharing 
practices best align universities’ virtues with their licensees’ behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
Precision medicine—the translation of patient-specific information into patient-specific 
therapy—presents numerous challenges to both clinical practice and intellectual property 
management. Universities, as the gatekeepers to much of the foundational IP in this area, have a 
special responsibility to ensure that precision therapies are developed broadly, and on reasonable 
terms, for the public. By abdicating that responsibility to surrogate companies, universities threaten 
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to limit the very public missions they strive to achieve. Developing precision medicine upon the 
foundation of university IP will likely require restrictions on the breadth and exclusivity of 
surrogate licenses and a commitment to making the knowledge generated by the licensees available 
to all. 
